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Barr: Post-9/11 Electronic Surveillance Severely Undermining Freedom

SYMPOSIUM ON ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE
POST–9/11 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
SEVERELY UNDERMINING FREEDOM
Bob Barr*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any article concerning surveillance must begin with these words:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.1
Unfortunately those words appear to be in disrepute, their meaning
denigrated, their import in disrepair. America, in the twenty-first
century, appears to have become afraid of—or disinterested in—the
“Grand Experiment in Freedom” begun almost 250 years ago by a group
of patriots determined to govern themselves free from the control of an
over-weaning and powerful government. Today, virtually the entire
range of policy decisions within the purview of our federal government
appear to be governed by fear, deception, or mistake—not by the
courage exemplified by our forefathers. We went to war in Iraq
ostensibly over the fear of “weapons of mass destruction.” President

Bob Barr represented the 7th District of Georgia in the U.S. House of Representatives
from 1995 to 2003, serving as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, Vice-Chairman
of the Government Reform Committee, and member of the Committee on Financial
Services. Bob is President and CEO of Liberty Strategies, L.L.C., a public policy consulting
firm headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. Bob was appointed by President Reagan to serve
as the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia (1986-90), and served as
President of Southeastern Legal Foundation (1990-91). He was an official with the CIA
(1971-78), and practiced law for many years. He currently serves Of Counsel with the Law
Offices of Edwin Marger, with a national and international practice in both civil and
criminal law.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
*
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Bush authorized a program of electronic surveillance of Americans
because he said it was necessary to “protect ourselves” from acts of
terrorism.2 The National Security Agency (“NSA”), or some other
agency, maintains that we can only be “protected” by listening to our
conversations without benefit of probable cause to believe that we are
actually a threat, nevermind that the program is illegal.3 Senators such
as Senator Specter of Pennsylvania and former Senator DeWine of Ohio
proposed to either legitimize that program ex post facto, or extend to the
executive ever increasing elasticity in shadowing American citizens.4
These are dark clouds obstructing freedom in American life today.
Some are covert; some are overt. Without the First Amendment, and a
relatively free press, there would have been no discovery of this or other
programs that are claimed by our benevolent government to have been
devised for our protection. What might we do without this overly
protective father figure looking after us? These new powers asserted by
the federal government—powers that the president claims are necessary
to protect us—were never intended to be part of the fabric of our society.
But through an assertive executive branch, a pliant Congress, and a
deferential judiciary, they have been sewn and stitched progressively
into our lives, just as surely as Betsy Ross stitched our first flag.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TODAY
The Republic’s founders intended flexibility and the concomitant
ability of the people and their government to be able to respond in a
fluid manner given the changing of the times. The Fourth Amendment
was meant to meet the needs of all Americans, and designated power to
their appointed temporary governing bodies only on those occasions
when it became necessary to intrude into the lives of its citizens and
violate their privacy in order to serve the greater good.
What lawyers in the Administration of George W. Bush apparently
fail to grasp in the government’s zeal to intrude into the private lives of
Americans by, among other things, the NSA electronic spying program
in the “War on Terror,” is that the law, and its attendant lawful behavior,
provide all the weapons needed to fight terrorism; no “sacrifices” are
necessary. No one disputes that there is a need to battle acts of

See Bruce Fein, Trusting the White House, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A13.
See id.
4
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3001,
109th Cong. (2006); Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006).
2
3
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terrorism, but the methods that the Bush Administration has chosen are
misdirected.
Of course, this process of government over-reaching did not start the
day after 9-11. In fact, since at least the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment
has been systematically whittled in favor of the government in a variety
of ways.5 In 1967, for example, in Katz v. United States,6 the Supreme
Court definitively defined, for the first time, the formula for a tightening
of access to the Fourth Amendment power of evidence-suppression. In
that landmark beginning, the Court intoned both a subjective and
objective “reasonable expectation of privacy” and, in doing so, mandated
that the privacy “expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’”7
Less than a generation later, in a trilogy of cases—Rakas v. Illinois,8
Rawlings v. Kentucky,9 and United States v. Salvucci10—the U.S. Supreme
Court set in motion a true loosening of the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment with the advent of the focus on “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” and created a seminal event in the history of the Amendment.11
What those decisions did, in practical terms, was to limit the “persons
and places searched” provision to an ever-shrinking number of people
and circumstances. In other words, if I put my drugs (or bomb-making
materials) in your briefcase, I could not complain about the search no
matter how constitutionally problematic, because I had given up my
“expectation of privacy.” This analysis based on the judicially-created
“expectation of privacy” test for Fourth Amendment protection,
however, makes little sense in many situations in which our citizens
necessarily find themselves involved in the modern world.

5
See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6
389 U.S. 347.
7
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
9
448 U.S. 98 (1980).
10
448 U.S. 83 (1980).
11
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104 (holding that considering petitioner’s admission at
suppression hearing that he did not believe acquaintance’s purse would be free from
search, there was not sufficient showing that his reasonable expectations of privacy were
violated); Salvucci, 447 U.S. at 93 (holding that Fourth Amendment rights should be
analyzed by asking not merely whether defendant had a possessory interest in the items
seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched); Rakas, 439 U.S.
at 148 (holding that there was no showing that mere passengers in a car had any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car).
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Is one private phone call more worthy of protection than another,
simply because of the particular phone we use? Do we have a lesser
“expectation of privacy” if we communicate by e-mail as opposed to
phone, simply because e-mail transmissions travel through an ISP over
which we have no control? Are our private medical records considered
by us to be less private simply because they are kept at our doctor’s
office where they necessarily must stay? Or are our private financial
records not considered to be private? Common sense tells us that such
situations are quite reasonably considered by Americans to be just as
“private” as the letters that were the more common mode of
communication in the late eighteenth century when the Fourth
Amendment was crafted. Yet, because of the artificial, “expectation of
privacy” test, through which the federal government has driven a Mack
truck, this common sense violation of privacy, which was the basis for
the Amendment, has been rent asunder.
Restrictions on the Fourth Amendment’s protections have not ended.
The federal courts, in their zeal to find reasons to justify expanded
government law enforcement powers, have found ever more imaginative
ways to limit personal freedom, especially those freedoms guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. The “good faith exception” of United States v.
Leon12 allowed searches even if the warrant subsequently was shown to
be unsupported by probable cause.13 Garbage is no longer protected.14
468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, on the basis of information from a confidential informant
of unproven reliability, the Burbank, California, police department set up surveillance of a
pair of individuals suspected to be involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Id. at 901. From
their investigation, the officers were led to Alberto Leon, who had been previously arrested
for a drug offense and about whom a different tip was received regarding storage of illegal
drugs. Id. at 901-02. Upon the arrest of two other suspects, the officers retrieved items that
they believed were utilized in Leon’s drug business. Id. Subsequently, a search warrant
was issued for Leon’s residence where drugs were found. Id. at 902. Leon challenged the
use of the evidence citing a lack of probable cause for issuance of the warrant, and the
government responded with the notion that the “exclusionary rule should not apply where
evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant.” Id. at 903.
13
Id. at 925.
14
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). In Greenwood, a Laguna Beach,
California police officer received information from both federal agents and a neighbor that
Greenwood may be involved in drug trafficking. Id. at 37. The officer attempted to verify
this information by setting up surveillance on Greenwood’s home. Id. She observed
vehicles making short stops late in the evening and followed one of these vehicles to
another residence that was also under investigation. Id. The officer asked the regular trash
collector to pick up and turn over Greenwood’s trash bags to her without mixing them
with the other collected trash, and when the garbage collector did so, the officer found
evidence of narcotics use within the trash. Id. at 37-38. The fruits of this search were the
basis for a warrant used to search the residence, which unearthed cocaine and hasish. Id.
Greenwood challenged the searches of his trash, contending, inter alia, that it violated his
12
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The mail, though protected generally, is now subject to a number of
exceptions;15 as a result, the protection of the mails is not absolute.16
Additionally, there is no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in bank
records despite the fact that in the modern world it is virtually
impossible to conduct necessary affairs in one’s own behalf without use
of financial institutions, credit cards, doctors’ offices, insurance
companies, and the myriad of other institutions prevalent in our lives. 17

Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The Supreme Court first explained that the search of the
trash “would violate the Fourth Amendment only respondents manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.” Id. at
39 (citations omitted). As a result, the Court found that the respondent had sufficiently
exposed his trash to the public as to defeat any claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
at 40. “It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public.” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court noted that the material had
been placed at the curb for transference to a third party, here, the trash collector. Id.
Therefore, “having deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public
inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of
having strangers take it,’ respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the inculpatory items that they discarded.” Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted).
15
United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003). In Young, the defendant was
convicted of various counts involving deception of IRS agents and making false statements
on IRS forms to enable him to purchase gasoline and diesel without paying federal excise
taxes. Id. at 1303-04. His scheme involved large and frequent cash transactions that were
sent to him via Federal Express two to three times per month. Id. at 1304. As part of its
investigation, an IRS agent requested that Federal Express allow the government to x-ray
the packages, without a warrant. Id. The packages were found to contain large amounts of
currency and based on this finding, four warrants were issued for searches of Young’s
residence and place of business. Id. at 1304-05. The Eleventh Circuit found that Young
“certainly had a subjective expectation (or hope) of privacy” but that “[n]o reasonable
person would expect to retain his . . . privacy interest in a packaged shipment after signing
an airbill containing a explicit, written warning that the carrier is authorized to act in direct
contravention to that interest.” Id. at 1307-08. Similarly, in United States v. Smith, after
receiving information that Smith was receiving illegal drugs, specifically LSD, in the mail,
using a third party to actually receive the material, the postal inspector intercepted a letter
that bore another person’s name and address, but had Smith’s name and address crossed
out on the envelope. 39 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir. 1994). When the other party allowed the
inspector and a police officer to open the letter in her presence, they discovered LSD. Id.
The letter was taped to Smith’s door, and the officer obtained a search warrant for the
residence. Id. At trial, Smith moved to suppress the letter, claiming that the third party
had agreed to accept the letter, which allegedly was supposed to contain cash from the
sender, but that she had no authority to open the letter. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found the arrangement that Smith had with the third party was insufficient to
preserve his legitimate expectation of privacy in the letter as he was neither the sender nor
the addressed recipient, even though he had not given permission for the third party to
open and examine the contents of the letter. Id. at 1145.
16
Young, 350 F.3d at 1309; Smith, 39 F.3d at 1145; see also supra note 15 (discussing Smith
and Young).
17
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 425 (1976).
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The courts have also upheld the substitution of the Aquilar-Spinelli
standard as it relates to the test of informant reliability.18 Similarly, in
Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court held that a purely anonymous tip
supported to some degree by corroboration (based on surveillance) of
some otherwise innocent data, could establish the legality of the search.19
In Gates, the Court concluded that a totality of the circumstances test
must be utilized to determine probable cause.20 Even stale information
can be updated and/or corroborated to form the basis for probable
cause.21
Recently, the Court has even found an anticipatory search warrant
lawful; that is, a search warrant that is granted but then can be simply
stuck in a police officer’s pocket or file to await a triggering event before
it is executed.22 In fact, even falsely sworn statements in a search

18
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (holding that informant’s basis of
knowledge and facts establishing informant’s reliability and credibility should be
considered in determining probable cause from this information); Aquilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964) (holding that affidavit for search warrant may be based on hearsay
information so long as informant is “credible”).
19
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
20
Id. The court concluded
[T]hat it is wiser to abandon the “two-pronged test” established by our
decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place, we reaffirm the totalityof-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probablecause determinations. . . . The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis
for . . . [concluding]” that probable cause existed. We are convinced
that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth
Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from
Aguilar and Spinelli.
Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted).
21
United States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999).
22
United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1500 (2006). In Grubbs, Mr. Grubbs purchased
child pornography from a website that was operated by a postal inspector acting
undercover. Id. at 1497. The delivery was arranged, and the postal inspector submitted a
warrant application to a federal magistrate detailing the operation. Id. There was a caveat
in the application, stating that
[e]xecution of this search warrant will not occur unless and until the
parcel has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken
into the residence. . . . At that time, and not before, this search warrant
will be executed by me and other United States postal inspectors, with
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warrant are no longer grounds to discard the warrant.23 This is true even
if the misrepresentations are knowingly made, but given the allowed
inclusion of other circumstances, even innocent ones, while discounting
the untruths, another justification is found for the search.24

appropriate assistance from other law enforcement officers in
accordance with this warrant’s command.
Id. (citations omitted). In addition, to this statement, the application relied on two
attachments that were not in the body of the warrant request that described both the
residence and items sought. Id. The warrant was issued as requested and the package
delivered two days later. Id. at 1497-98. Grubbs’ wife signed for the package, took it inside,
and moments later, inspectors and officers detained Grubbs as he attempted to leave his
home. Id. Grubbs was supplied with a copy of the warrant approximately thirty minutes
into the search, but the items supplied to Grubbs did not include the affidavit which
described the triggering condition of the search warrant. Id. Grubbs consented to
interrogation, admitted to ordering the tape, was placed under arrest and items seized. Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of these so-called “anticipatory” search warrants,
stating that “they are no different in principle from ordinary warrants.” Id.
23
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172-73 (1978). In Franks, Cynthia Bailey reported to
police on March 5, 1976, that she had been sexually assaulted by a man in her home. Id. at
156. Bailey provided a description of her assailant, detailing that he wore a white thermal
undershirt, black pants with a metallic buckle, a brown leather coat, and a dark knit cap.
Id. She also described some of his physical characteristics, including age, weight, race,
height, build and facial hair. Id. By coincidence, that same day, Franks was arrested in
connection with a different assault of a fifteen year old identified as “Brenda B.” Id. While
awaiting a bail hearing, Franks made an incriminating statement before being read his
Miranda rights, expressing confusion over who it was alleged that he assaulted. Id. On
March 8, the officer who heard the incriminating statement mentioned it to a detective on
the Bailey case. Id. at 157. Based in part on this information, the detective sought a search
warrant, including in his application affidavits from those who worked with Franks that
indicated that he often wore the type of clothing that Bailey indicated was worn by her
assailant. Id. The judge issued the warrant and officers seized items matching the
description Bailey provided. Id. Franks challenged the admissibility of the evidence,
noting that the warrant was not truthful and that those allegedly interviewed by the
applying officer were not and that any information they may have given to another officer
differed from what was presented in the affidavit. Id. The Court ultimately held that to
challenge a warrant based on veracity of the affidavit, the challenger must not present a
conclusory statement that the warrant was based on untruths, but rather
[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by
an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the
warrant or affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be
accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons.
Id. at 171.
24
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) (holding that a search
warrant could have been procured without relying on a hidden beeper, but rather via the
visual surveillance of the defendant’s vehicle and residence); United States v. Levasseur,
816 F.2d 37, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1987) (asserting that thirty paragraphs in the Cross Affidavit
supplied sufficient independent information to support a finding of probable cause).
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There are numerous other examples of this continuing and profound
lessening of prohibition against governmental intrusion. The courts
continue, by and large, to be in lockstep with various administrations,
including the current one. For example, even as it solidified the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, the Supreme Court held
that the use of a pen register does not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment.25 And recently, courts have gone further when
addressing computer privacy issues. In United States v. Steiger, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a “Trojan Horse” virus that enables a hacker to
discover and download files from another person’s computer is not
unlawful because interception is defined as containing a requirement
that the electronic communication be obtained contemporaneously with
its transmission.26 Thus, a government hacker can lawfully search all of
the files in existence on any citizen’s computer and seize the same files
on the sole basis that the files were electronically created at a time prior
to the search and seizure.
All of these examples, which are not exhaustive, are weapons that
are being utilized by the government, not only as part of its “War on
Terror,” but in other types of criminal investigations as well.
III. TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT SUPPLANT FREEDOM
A new era of science and technology envelopes us; technology has
opened new vistas to snoop beyond any extent envisioned by those
founding geniuses, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and James
Madison, among others.
To be sure, we as a nation have been attacked; we are at peril from a
new kind of enemy—a shadowy, will o’ the wisp enemy is at our shores.
We should not shrink from this exacting truth. But, were not the threats
to our shores, our very existence, in 1776 and in the first few decades
thereafter, also serious? Were they any less dangerous to the infant
25
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1979). “Pen register” is defined as “a
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released.” Id. at 736 n.1. The
Court held that the pen register did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes because a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
numbers she may dial on a telephone. Id. at 742. Additionally, the Court noted that pen
registers have no ability to record the contents of the communications, and that “all
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company. . . [and] moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent
records of the numbers they dial.” Id.
26
318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003).
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nation than the threats facing us today? The fledgling country was at
risk at every turn, but in the exercise of the kind of vision and courage
that has been our trademark throughout our history, our Founding
Fathers did not flinch from their belief in a freedom such as the world
had never seen, and has yet to be duplicated. They fashioned a fair, but
strict, set of prohibitions that focused its force on the power of the
government to intrude upon the rights and privacy of its citizens. Are
we in greater danger now than then? I think not. Our neophyte nation
possessed but a ragtag collection of volunteers to defend our shores, and
little military equipment. Now, two and a quarter centuries later, we
have a standing army, navy, and air force that certainly is the most
powerful by far of any in the world today. Are we at risk? Certainly,
but do we demolish the tenets of the very fiber of the being of our nation
to meet those challenges? Or do we remain true to what we have always
been?
Technology, especially electronic technology, tempts the
dilettante, is like the biblical serpent to the slothful, and invites abuse.
That threat cannot be allowed to change or diminish the
underpinnings of the way of life we espouse. We cannot abandon our
beliefs.
A. Lawful Interdiction Methods Exist
News Flash—The Fourth Amendment works! So does the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”),27 and the special court created by
FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). There is no
necessity whatsoever, under the guise of “protecting” us from acts of
terrorism, to create new vehicles of legally or illegally-sanctioned
intrusion into the lives of Americans. Nor is it wise to legalize an illegal
program—the NSA spying program; to do so would be constitutionally
devastating. The interrelationship of the tri-partite form of government
would actually work if the legislative and judicial branches would
simply stop rolling over and allowing the executive branch to neuter
them.
Each branch must fully comprehend and carry out its
constitutionally-defined role. This is especially true in light of the fact
that advances in technology and science now enable any government to
secretly invade a citizen’s privacy at will and to whatever extent it
desires. In the words of Louis Brandeis: Privacy is the “right to be let

27

50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000).
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alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”28
I have a friend, a former trial lawyer, who shared a story of a case in
the late 1970’s in a small town in Vermont. The defendants in a criminal
case were distributing marijuana and hashish from a farmhouse well off
the beaten path. The Vermont State Police received a tip and, since they
could not get physically close, they used devices developed in Viet Nam,
a Startron29 and Javelin,30 to spy from a great distance.
These devices—even way back then—were able to read a newspaper
from as far as two miles away, provided, of course, there were no
obstructions. The police chose not to seek a warrant, but rather to
surveil. Among the things they watched were the bathroom activities of
some of the dopers’ girlfriends. As frequently happens in “the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”31 there was no
independent judicial determination of probable cause, even though it
likely existed. My friend reminded me of the curtilage cases, notably
Hester v. United States32 and its progeny, and stated he had framed his
motion to suppress around the “curtilage” invasion issue. He won much
of the motion; the fact of which saved his client about ten years of his
life. Had the police obtained a warrant, all evidence almost certainly
would have been admissible. The other important point for these
considerations is that over thirty years ago, there existed the ability to
visually intrude from miles away. Now, just consider where we are
today—heat-seeking cameras of phenomenal range; cell phone
transponders and microphones; cameras that can read license plates
from space; data mining computers that make information retrieval
systems, of one generation removed, seem so ancient that they appear to
be like writing on stone tablets.
The question remains: does the government have to resort to illegal
activity to protect us? Or is it sufficient to simply follow existing law
and the principles and requirements of the Constitution?

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
Robert C. Power, Criminal Law: Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed
Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 28 n.92 (1989). “Startron” is
a night vision scope. Id.
30
Id. at 83 n.262. A Javelin is a nightscope, “capable of magnifying existing light 50,000
times.” Id.
31
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
32
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
28
29
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This debate and inquiry are framed around the desire for freedom as
balanced against occasionally necessary intrusions by a government, but
premised always on the notion that we have a government that is itself
to be governed by restraint. In the post-9/11 world, the necessary
restraint has been lost, and although some of it had perished even prior
to 9/11, the process has accelerated greatly since that awful day. Science
and technology have long since left nothing to deter it save the
determination of the humans who utilize it.
There is recently, a wonderful, thoughtful, and well-researched book
by David Holtzman titled Privacy Lost, which I will now discuss.33 I
commend it to anyone concerned about the future of freedom and
privacy in America.
The NSA and the view of the president that it is his absolute right to
authorize any wiretap he deems appropriate notwithstanding, there are
only two lawful bases for the creation of a legal wiretap: the Federal
Wiretap Act34 and the FISA35 of a decade later. After 9/11, the USA
PATRIOT Act36 added to the list of crimes for which a wiretap could be
legal, now including violent activities, terrorism, and suspected
hijacking. 37
The Federal Wiretap Act is, as it should be, a tightly regulated
statute controlled by the courts of the United States. The fundamental
procedure is that an application is made; if there is probable cause a
judicial warrant is provisionally issued; then there are controls upon the
listening, and a report back to the court is mandatory.38 Thus, not only is
there a court-required sanction, but continued judicial oversight.39
FISA has been the law of the land since 1978.40 In its essence, the law
is a portion of the solution to the problem of terrorism, which is part and
parcel of a new form of espionage. Espionage is defined by Webster’s as

DAVID H. HOLTZMAN, PRIVACY LOST (2006).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)) (known as the Federal
Wiretap Act).
35
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000).
36
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115
Stat. 212 (2001).
37
Id.
38
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
39
Id. § 2518(6).
40
See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000).
33
34
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the “practice of spying,” but in practical reality it is more.41 It is also the
attendant desire to do harm to the entity spied upon, as those upon
whom the spying is being perpetrated are presumably the enemy of
those who are doing the spying. FISA and its court are equipped to
address the fight against terrorism, as it was equipped to address the
spying of every enemy that has existed since FISA was enacted and as
strengthened since 9/11.
FISA, and the court created by it, allow for the issuance of warrants
for surveillance of our nation’s enemies, administer the prosecution
procedures of those enemies once caught, and control the dissemination
of the evidence to those appropriately able to have access to it.42 For
example, a defense lawyer for a person charged with a crime of
espionage against the United States must be cleared by the FBI to the
same extent as the nature of the evidence involved in the case. If the
crime involves “Top Secret” evidence, then the lawyer must consent to a
background check for clearance to a level of “Top Secret.” Access to the
evidence is monitored by a professional staff and never leaves a secure
facility except under guard with prior court approval. This is the
appropriate, pre-existing procedure that addresses this category of
evidence in the fight against terrorists. The judges of FISC are selected
by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.43 What is important here
is that it is a court—a branch of the judiciary—constitutionally charged
with balancing powers of the executive branch by its oversight. Or, in
the words of too many to count, the decisions are of “a neutral and
detached” decision-maker (magistrate). This is, yet again, another
example of how we, in the main as a nation, prior to this Administration,
have sought to maintain the balance of a tri-partite government.
Although, it should be noted, the USA PATRIOT Act diminished the
standard from the traditional “probable cause” to “reasonable cause.”44
B. The NSA and Government Snooping
Where does a secret and warrantless NSA spying program fit within
these parameters? Simply put, it does not. However, President Bush
reportedly concluded that FISA warrants took too long to obtain, so the

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 427 (11th ed. 2003).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846. For example, § 1842 provides the procedure for and format
requirements for pen trap devices. Further, the use of the information is governed by 50
U.S.C. § 1845. The Act also provides for congressional oversight. Id. § 1846.
43
Id. § 1842.
44
50 U.S.C. § 3103 (2000).
41
42
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NSA spying program was initiated shortly after 9/11.45 The program,
dubbed by the Administration as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program”
as part of its effort to lead the public—and Congress—to believe it did
not surveil U.S. citizens within the U.S. borders (which it did), authorizes
the NSA to wiretap without seeking a warrant.46 President Bush
apparently authorized it in 2002 by secret executive order. “Vast
quantities of international telephone and Internet communications were
intercepted without court approval.”47 The president originally claimed
that only people connected to Al-Qaeda were tapped, but that has been
subsequently determined to be false.48 A president, under the guise of
national security, is wiretapping Americans without benefit of the
interposition of the courts and without probable cause, simply because
he believes his role as “commander in chief” allows him to do so.
It is not only the NSA program that is suspect. The FBI has engaged
in a program of attempting to track the locations of cell phone users; but
two federal judges, one in New York and the other in Texas, have
stopped them (at least temporarily) in the absence of a showing of
evidence that a crime had occurred or is in progress.49 The respective
courts in those cases concluded that to allow the FBI to go forward
would violate long-standing privacy protections.50 More recently, in
court proceedings, it has been revealed that federal agents are using cell
phones to serve as general microphones—to listen to and record
conversations not only by the holder of the cell phone, but others in the

45
HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 231. “In 2005, the New York Times ran an article revealing
that President Bush had signed a secret executive order in 2002 authorizing the NSA to
conduct warrantless wiretaps of Americans.” Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. “Last year, Bush said he had authorized the NSA to eavesdrop—without
warrants—on international calls and international e-mails of people suspected of having
links to terrorists when one party to the communication is in the USA.” Leslie Cauley, Bush
Lied Repeatedly About Scope of NSA Spying on Americans, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available
at http://www.unknownnews.org/0605190511NSAspying.html.
48
HOLTZMAN, supra note 33; see also Cauley, supra note 47 (“The NSA program reaches
into homes and businesses across the nation by amassing information about the calls of
ordinary Americans—most of whom aren’t suspected of any crime.”).
49
See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, FBI Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
2005, at A05. “The FBI may not track the locations of cell phone users without showing
evidence that a crime occurred or is in progress, two federal judges ruled, saying that to do
so would violate long-established privacy protections.” Id. These rulings came as
controversy increased over the ability of the federal government to conduct domestic
surveillance as a result of the broadened powers granted under the USA PATRIOT Act
after the 9-11 attacks. Id.
50
Id.
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vicinity—a process that can be accomplished even if the cell phone is not
turned on.51
An observation: whenever any legislative body takes action based
on fear, the results are generally deleterious. The USA PATRIOT Act
was conceived in fear; its gestation infested with fear; fear was its
midwife; and its infancy fed by fear. The Act presented an invitation to
abuse, and of course government agencies have accepted the invitation
wholeheartedly. This law was intended to facilitate the interdiction of
terrorism and terrorists.52
Holtzman chronicles the abuses with
explanations of each, but here they are referred to generically by type of
target. The Act has been used to target anti-war protesters, organized
crime, pranksters, the homeless, and artists.53 It has been utilized to
protect the intellectual property of big business.54 Similarly, the Act was
the moving force in the deportation of an ideological undesirable.55 Of
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Anne Borache, FBI Taps Cell Phone Mic as Eavesdropping
Tool, CNET NEWS, Dec. 1, 2006, available at http://news.com.com/FBI+taps+cell+phone+
mic+as+eavesdropping+tool/2100-1029_3-6140191.html. “The technique is called a ‘roving
bug,’ and was approved by top U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against
members of a New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional
surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping him.” Id.
52
The very title of the Act reveals the purpose: “Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”
53
HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 226-29. In 2004, Drake University was ordered under the
authority of the USA PATRIOT Act to surrender all documents regarding an anti-war
conference held on its campus. Id. at 226. Additionally, a “Justice Department report refers
to more than a dozen cases in which federal authorities have used the Act to investigate
private citizens, order surveillance, use wiretaps, and seize assets in nonterrorism criminal
cases . . . . Money laundering, drug trafficking, blackmail and white-collar crimes are just a
small sampling. . . . ” Id. at 227. As for pranksters, the Justice Department is prosecuting a
citizen as a terrorist for pointing a hand-held laser at an airplane. Id. Further, a homeless
man in New Jersey was arrested as a terrorist for loitering in a train station. Id. Steve
Kurtz, an artist who used materials he created in a home laboratory for sculpture materials,
was impacted by the USA PATRIOT Act when his wife of twenty years died of heart
failure at their home. Id. at 230. When medical authorities tending to Mrs. Kurtz noticed
the laboratory equipment, the FBI was notified and they sealed off his home, confiscating
everything including his wife’s body. Id. He was labeled as a “bioterrorist” by the FBI and
was indicted for “mail and wire fraud” and faces up to twenty years in prison. Id.
54
Id. at 228. The FBI invoked the USA PATRIOT Act to obtain financial records from the
ISP of an individual who ran a fan web site dedicated to the television show Stargate SG-1.
Id. The fan was allegedly engaged in criminal copyright infringement and because of his
world wide contacts via his website, he was alleged to have been engaged in a conspiracy
against the Motion Picture Association. Id.
55
Id. Sami-Al-Hyssayen, a student at the University of Idaho, was arrested for his work
as webmaster for the Islamic Assembly of North America. Id. As part of his job, he
maintained links to outside web sites, some of which advocated criminal activity. Id.
Although he was ultimately found not guilty of terrorism, in exchange for that verdict, he
agreed to be deported. Id.
51
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course, it has also been used to target Muslims.56 How is it done?
Technology is the fulcrum—surveillance, wire taps, telephone taps,
computers bugs—all weapons in the arsenal of the contemporary
government watchers.
One of the many ironies of the NSA domestic surveillance spying
program is that there was a Justice Department investigation conducted,
but not into the legality or illegality of the program itself.57 Rather the
investigation was undertaken to determine the identity of those who had
leaked information confirming the existence of the program. Instead of
determining whether the NSA program violated our laws—FISA,58 the
Stored Communications Act,59 and/or the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act60—the top law enforcement agency of the nation is looking
to identify the people who informed the public of the wrongdoing of its
government.61
Congress has the power to create rules governing any surveillance
based on the Constitution’s structure of shared power over the nation’s
defense.62 The president may possess some inherent authority to
monitor the communications of Americans in the name of national
security, but it is neither unilateral nor unlimited. The Congress, when it
passed FISA, made repeated findings of the importance that any
surveillance conform with the judicial checks and balances requirements
of the Fourth Amendment. All of this was done because it has become
evident over the years that the NSA, or any other agency of the
government, was not to be trusted absolutely. In earlier decades, the
NSA had created files on such “threats” as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Joan
Baez, and Martin Luther King, Jr.63 Indeed, the NSA attempted to
surveil all Quakers in the United States, except, of course, the Quaker
President, Richard M. Nixon.64 Had it included the former president in
its effort, the NSA might have avoided Watergate.

Id. at 228-29. “The New York Times reported that thirty-four credible human rights
complaints were made by Arab and Muslim immigrants over a six month period in 2003.”
Id.
57
HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 231.
58
50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846 (2000).
59
47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
60
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
61
Dan Eggen, Size & Scope of the Interagency Investigative Tool Worry Civil Libertarians,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at A07.
62
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 8.
63
HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 220 n.14.
64
Id.
56
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But the year 1978 appears to be too long ago to have kept the
congressional memories fresh; the collective memory seems to have
forgotten the four precepts of FISA. First, Congress must have full and
complete disclosure of all surveillance programs.65 Second, Congress
commanded that the statutory procedures it created—FISA—would be
the “exclusive” procedures for conducting surveillance of Americans in
the name of national security.66 Third, Congress required a judicial
check on every wiretap of the electronic communications of Americans
in this country.67 Fourth, and finally, the Congress, through FISA,
required that court orders be predicated upon probable cause either that
the target of electronic surveillance was an “agent of a foreign power” (a
term very broadly defined in the law) or was an American citizen
knowingly conspiring with or aiding such an agent.68
Although FISA has been amended a number of times since its 1978
enactment, including several changes effected by the 2001 USA
PATRIOT Act, these four requirements/prohibitions have never been
removed or weakened.69 They have remained in full force and effect,
serving the nation well since their enactment almost thirty years ago.
Indeed, at a public hearing in 2000, before the House Intelligence
Committee, then NSA Director, General Mike Hayden (now head of the
CIA), testified explicitly that if the NSA believed it necessary to surveil a
U.S. person in the United States, the NSA must secure—and always did
secure—a court order.70 Now, other than new enemies, and new
responders in the government, what has changed? Not the warrant
requirement under FISA; that remains the law of the land in 2007 as it
did in 2000 when General Hayden so testified.

65
50 U.S.C. § 1808 (2000). “On a semiannual basis the attorney general shall fully inform
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, concerning all electronic
surveillance under this title.” Id. § 1808(a)(1).
66
Id. § 1808.
67
Id. § 1842. Judicial oversight is required via the detailed procedure laid out in this
section for obtaining a warrant. See id. § 1842(a)-(b).
68
Id. § 1842(a)(1) (providing that an application may be made to install a pen trap device
if it is to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or
that the application was not based on protected first amendment activities); see also id.
§ 1801(b).
69
Id. §§ 1841-1846, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-272 (2001);
Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001); Pub. L. Nos. 107-108 and 108-458 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-177
(2006).
70
Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. (Apr. 12,
2000) (statement of Gen. Mike Hayden).
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The largely somnambulant post-9/11 Congress reacted concerning
disclosures of the NSA spying program, as mentioned earlier, with two
different bills, one by Senator Specter, the other by now-former Senator
DeWine.71 Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, a highly respected
member of the Senate, a former U.S. Attorney, and immediate past
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee proposed Senate Bill 2453
on March 15, 2006, titled the “National Security Surveillance Act of
2006.”72 It is important to note, were he able to get the bill passed,
Senator Specter would have changed the law to adjust the four pillars of
FISA.73 Much like Congress seems to have lost its way after 9/11, the Bill
would neuter the most important elements of FISA. In so doing, the
Congress would cede any involvement in checks and balances as
envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Partisan politics aside, why would
any legislative body, in this form of government, do such a thing? The
answer is simple, but overwhelmingly disturbing—Congress had
abandoned its prerogatives.
Mandatory congressional oversight would have disappeared under
the Specter bill.74 Congress would legislate without investigating
because the Judiciary Committee, according to the White House, has no
right to obtain facts concerning how the executive branch is executing
FISA (or ignoring it). This is true, in spite of the fact that Congress is
entitled to full disclosure of all surveillance programs.75 This represents
an absolute abdication of responsibility.
Senator Specter’s bill would have repealed the requirement that the
president follow the FISA warrant rules; it also would have done away
with the criminal penalties for violations.76 The president, in this

71
National Security Surveillance Act, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006); Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2006, S. 3848, 109th Cong. (2006).
72
National Security Surveillance Act, S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 1-9 (2006).
73
S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 4-7.
74
S. 2453, 109th Cong. §7.
75
50 U.S.C. § 1808 (2000).
76
S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 8, 706. Section 8 states that:
It is in our Nation’s best interest for Congress to use its oversight
power to establish a system to ensure that electronic surveillance
programs do not infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans,
while at the same time making sure that the President has all the
powers and means necessary to detect and track our enemies.
Section 706 provides emergency authorization for the President to authorize electronic
surveillance without a warrant.
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scenario, would be forgiven of any criminal misconduct, no matter how
egregious, as would be all of his subordinates.77
The bill would have made judicial oversight optional.78 The
administration could, if it chose, seek the approval of the courts, or
alternatively not, as the case may be. In other words, it would have
given the president the option of following the law or ignoring it. Such a
scenario certainly was never intended to prevail in our system of
government, based as it is on specified and limited government powers
and respect for the courts and for individual privacy.
The Specter bill also would have eliminated the “probable cause”
requirement, meaning there could be electronic surveillance of you or
me, for any reason or no reason.79 The decision would be purely at the
discretion of whatever executive branch employee made it.80 When one
considers how insubstantial the hurdle of “probable cause” is generally
for law enforcement, the scenario allowed by the Specter bill would
constitute a gift-wrapping of all of our freedoms and tossing them down
the drain.
The ACLU proposed an appropriate alternative to the Specter and
DeWine bills in the previous, 109th Congress.81 This bill, the “Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006,”
would have accomplished exactly what the title indicated. Its salient
points were a re-emphasis of the exclusivity of FISA for electronic
surveillance, while maintaining a warrant requirement (although the
time strictures would be relaxed).82 It also streamlined and added
resources for this specialized court. In particular, this 2006 legislation
would have extended the emergency electronic surveillance period from
three days to seven, which either the NSA or the FBI could initiate,
provided the Attorney General was notified within twenty-four hours
and the application was made within seven days.83 The Attorney
General could also delegate authority to approve applications to a
Deputy Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General for National

S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 8, 706.
S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 6, 704.
79
S. 2453, 109th Cong. § 703(a).
80
Id.
81
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3877,
109th Cong. (2006).
82
Id. For example, section 201 would have extended the time stricture from 72 hours to
168 hours. Id. § 201.
83
S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 203, 105(g)(3).
77
78
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Security.84
In addition, the ACLU-backed proposal allowed for
additional judges and appropriations for the same.85 It also provided
document security procedures and a specific personnel increase in
needed areas.86 Finally, the FISA improvement bill would have allowed
for streamlined procedures to facilitate the needs of the government in
protecting the nation.87
All told, the ACLU proposal would have met the needs of twentyfirst century priorities so that law enforcement would not be hampered
in its battle against terrorists and acts of terrorism. Indeed, it would
have enhanced the capabilities of law enforcement while maintaining
what should be a universally cherished standard of privacy, unless and
until there is a reason for intruding on it. By maintaining the
interposition of a court (though a secret one) and a warrant requirement
(though a relaxed one) there is an intermediate step, and a need to justify
an intrusion that is, and should be, fundamental to a free society. In the
context of refusing a blank check for the executive branch, and
reinforcing the involvement of the judiciary, the legislature would take
an important step toward the re-promulgation of a system of checks and
balances that has eroded significantly since September 11th.
Aside from the illegal secret listening and snooping NSA program,
this administration has been extremely active through the ordinary
channels of FISA. Since the 9-11 terrorist attacks, FISA warrants have
increased by seventy-five percent.88 In 2000, a year before the attacks,
there were 1,003 approved FISA warrants.89 Since the attacks, and postPATRIOT Act, there were 1,724 warrants approved in 2003, and 1,754 in
2004.90 These warrants, almost never declined by the court, have been
obtained to break into homes, offices, hotel rooms, and automobiles.91
They have also been used to install hidden cameras, search luggage,
eavesdrop on telephone conversations, watch from great distances, pry
into safety deposit boxes, and intercept emails.92 However, every one of
these, no matter the nature of the intrusion, was accompanied by a
warrant, administered presumably pursuant to either a probable cause
S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 206.
S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 204.
86
S. 3877, 109th Cong. §§ 205-206.
87
Id.
88
The Associated Press, Government Wiretaps, Searches up 75 Percent, Apr. 1, 2005,
www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/37/10080.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
84
85
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standard or the USA PATRIOT Act “reasonable cause” standard.93 Even
though the court is secret, somewhere in each instance there is a paper
trail, and perhaps a somewhat therapeutic pause in law enforcement zeal
while the determination was made to secure the warrant. In short, the
Fourth Amendment is at least a part of the equation, giving the
individual citizen at least a fighting chance that his or her privacy was
afforded due protection.
IV. NEW SURVEILLANCE REDUNDANCE
The Administration’s fellow travelers are not limited to the Congress
and its attendant reluctance—at least until just recently with the new
majority in the 110th Congress—to stand and be counted. There are
many others whose involvement comes about in a variety of ways with a
significant emphasis on money. One only need look at the total of the
Homeland Security Grants of Fiscal Year 2005 to know of the enormous
amount of dollars being spent, and the nature of the expenditures. The
“State Homeland Security Grant Program” awarded a total dollar
amount of $1,062,285,226.94
The “Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program” awarded $386,285,537.95 The “Citizen Corps
Program” awarded $13,485,708.96 The total awards for Fiscal Year 2005
were just under $1,500,000,000.97
Was this money well spent to preserve our lives and our freedom? A
simple analysis of the use of the funds in several locations might answer
those questions. For example, in Chicago, there is a rapidly expanding
“Homeland Security Grid” that currently has at least 2,250 cameras, with
more being added each year thanks to federal funding.98 In 2006,
Chicago completed a 900-mile fiber-optic grid connected to a $43 million
operations center that is constantly monitored by police officers, with
each camera costing $60,000.99 This money might be considered well-

18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS FY05, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Grants_
Summary_StLocal.xls (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance: More Cities Deploy
Camera Surveillance Systems with Federal Grant Money (May 2005), http://www.epic.org/
privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0505/ hereinafter EPIC].
99
Id.; see also Hal Dardick, City Will Keep Eyes Peeled Big Time, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2005, at
C1 (detailing the extensive camera system that Chicago planned to implement including a
fiber optic grid of over 1,000 miles and “biochemical sensors to watch for signs of
terrorism”).
93
94
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spent if it had actually decreased the threat of terrorism and if it did not
coincidentally intrude into the legitimate privacy of its citizens. On a
related point, in 2004, a Milwaukee, Wisconsin study found that law
enforcement officials in such cities as Detroit, Michigan; Miami, Florida;
and Oakland, California; abandoned the use of programs utilizing these
surveillance systems because they had little demonstrable effect on crime
prevention.100
Currently, a number of American cities are looking to Great Britain’s
surveillance system when developing their own. London already has
more than 200,000 cameras, with more than four million deployed
throughout the country.101 In Great Britain, estimates indicate there is
one camera for every fourteen people, and that the average Briton is on
camera over 300 times a day.102 Yet “studies have shown these systems
have little effect on crime.” 103 “It is [much] more effective to place more
officers” in a location and keep it well lighted.104 If it is true that these
types of surveillance units do not significantly impact crime, then how
effective are they at interdicting terrorist activity? As a partial answer to
this question no bomber has been caught in Britain as a result of the
country’s extensive camera system.
“According to a January [2003] report by J.P. Freeman, a security
market-research firm in Newtown, Connecticut, [some] twenty six
million . . . cameras” had, at that time, been installed worldwide.105
More than eleven million of those had been installed in the United States,
and many more by now.106 Some municipalities are now incorporating

100
EPIC, supra note 98; see also Ryan Davis, Surveillance Cameras May Soon Be Coming to a
Street Near You, BALT. SUN, Mar. 16, 2005, at 1B. The Milwaukee study found that “cities
were most commonly using closed-circuit surveillance located in police cars, interrogation
rooms, government buildings, for special events and in high crime areas.” Id. Despite
improving technology, only 20% of police agencies surveyed in the study found that these
cameras were effective in reducing crime. Id.
101
EPIC, supra note 98
102
Id.
103
Id.; see also Davis, supra note 98.
104
EPIC, supra note 98; see also BRANDON C. WELSH AND DAVID P. FARRINGTON, HOME
OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, CRIME PREVENTION EFFECTS
OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW, RESEARCH STUDY 252 (Aug. 2002).
105
Dan Farmer & Charles C. Mann, Surveillance Nation: Part One, TECH. REV., Apr. 2003,
at 34, 36. Farmer and Mann discuss throughout how the low priced surveillance
technologies can assist citizens in protecting their safety and property, at the same time, “as
these informal intelligence-gathering networks overlap and invade our privacy, that very
security and convenience could evaporate.” Id. at 34.
106
Id. at 36.
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sound-surveillance devices with cameras.107 However, the use of these
cameras by the government, and the images captured, is questionable.
A. Are the Priorities in Order?
The FBI purports to be the point entity in the “War on Terrorism”
and yet there is evidence that valuable resources have been utilized
gathering information on antiwar and environmental activists. “‘They
don’t know where Osama bin Laden is, but they’re spending money
watching people like me,’ said environmental activist, Kirsten Atkins.”108
Atkins’s license plate number had shown up in an FBI terrorism file after
she had attended a protest in Colorado Springs against the lumber
industry.109
In 2006, “an FBI counterterrorism official showed the class, at the
University of Texas at Austin, 35 slides listing militia, neo-Nazi, and
Islamist groups.”110 “Senior Special Agent Charles Rasner said one slide,
labeled ‘Anarchism,’ was a federal analyst’s list of groups that people
intent on terrorism might [well be] associate[d] with. The list included
Food Not Bombs, which mainly serves vegetarian food to homeless
people . . .”111
What is troubling about these incidents, and numerous others, is that
this is indicative of a culture, a thought process. Remembering that these
are the same genre of people who are manning the electronic and visual
surveillance apparatus, what does such overreaching portend?
Does all of this mean we have become what science fiction writer
David Brin called in 1998 “the transparent society?”112 “The far-sighted
Brin underestimated how quickly technological advances . . . would
make universal surveillance” a very real probability.113 Modern-day
microprocessors have become immensely powerful, network
transmissions incredibly fast, hard drives larger, electronics cheaper, and
software more sophisticated and powerful.114 Improvements are made
daily. This makes it imperative that manipulators of information and
surveillance be held accountable. They must also be controlled by
107
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109
110
111
112
113
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effective laws and aggressive enforcement of those laws. By 2023 (if not
sooner), experts predict that any large organization with resources of just
$10 million “will be able to devote the equivalent of a contemporary PC
to monitoring every one of the projected 330 million people who will
then be living in the United States.”115 So it is not only the government
that is a subject of concern, but the private sector as well.
B. Defective Data Records
Of equal importance, as are the law and the responsibility of the
government keeper’s, is the care taken in creating the databases and the
information contained within them. In 2003, Marc Rotenberg, Executive
Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”), a nonprofit research organization in Washington, D.C., stated: “What seem to
be small scale, discrete systems end up being combined into large
databases.” 116 He pointed, by way of example, to the then-recent,
voluntary efforts of a variety of merchants in Washington, D.C.’s affluent
Georgetown to pool and integrate their in-store, closed-circuit television
networks, to make the combine recorded activity available to the
police.117
In his concern, Rotenberg viewed the collection and
consolidation of individual surveillance networks into big government
and industry programs as “a strange mix of public and private, and it’s
not something that the legal system has encountered much before.”118
The question, among others, of these conglomerate databases is,
what if there is defective information contained within them? According
to the experts, this is so commonplace as to be beyond question. The
result is a potentially monster database being used to shadow, target,
and move against innocent citizens.
Computer scientists use the term “GIGO” (garbage in, garbage out)
to describe the situation of erroneous information becoming a part of a
database.119 Once in, it skews the validity of the database.120 Whether
people are buying bread or building bombs, governments and
commercial enterprises are trying to predict their behavior, through such
“data mining” (recall the movie “Minority Report”). The process of
predicting behavior is an integration of data from widely diverse
115
116
117
118
119
120
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sources. Starting with the Internet and proceeding along to such things
as library records, credit-card receipts, customer cards, and financial or
medical records, data miners use such information to form their
predictions. But—and this is a significant “but”—there are problems.
The first problem, of course, is the premise on which data mining is
based—that disparate bits of data on a diverse universe of people (e.g.,
all people who travel by air) can be employed to predict behavior of a
very small number (e.g., persons planning to hijack an airliner). Also, of
course, is the fact that all of these sources are filled with errors. Names
are misspelled, one digit is off, information becomes out of date by a
move or a change of Internet provider, and most importantly, formatting
distinctions between different databases can cause distortions and
information loss when merged.121 Perhaps the buyer of bread becomes
the bomber and the suspected bomber is merely buying bread.
Larry English, of Information Impact, a database consulting
company in Brentwood, Tennessee, stated: “It is routine to find in large
customer databases defective records . . . at rates of at least 20 to 35
percent.”122 Given the government’s track record, which includes
maintenance of “watch lists” containing names of such well-known
public officials as Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy and Georgia
Congressman John Lewis, it is only fair to presume that secret
government databases suffer from such errors of at least a similar
magnitude.
Effective use of large surveillance databases can be problematic aside
from the fact it destroys the notion of privacy. The systems are already
in place; it is their use which must be responsible, careful, and lawful.
Reactive use, rather than proactive use, might be one starting point. For
example, the 2002 Washington, D.C., sniper search might have utilized
the surveillance cameras to pinpoint repeat blue Chevy appearances on
cameras at the scenes as opposed to attempting to predict that a person
or persons who was disgruntled, had trouble at home, and was
militarily-trained, was the shooter.
Gene Spafford, Director of Purdue University’s Center for Education
and Research in Information Assurance and Security, said in 2003:
“Almost all of the pieces of a surveillance society are already here. It’s
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just a matter of assembling them.”123 That process has had an additional
three years to continue. The “War on Terror” makes it absolutely certain
it has continued. Where do the invalid answers from the tracking
systems affect us? Invalid answers can be harmless. If Victoria’s Secret
mistakenly mails one percent of its spring catalogue to people who are
not interested in lingerie, the price exacted to both consumer and
company is small. However, if we are discussing a national terrorist
tracking system, and the rate of error is that same one percent (an
unrealistically low estimate), then it will produce enormous numbers of
false alarms, sending investigators on too many wild goose chases, and
perhaps worst of all, mis-label innocent Americans.124 As Spafford
stated: “A 99 percent hit rate is great for advertising, but terrible for
spotting terrorism.”125
Where do we demand oversight to combat these errors in the
databases of the governments? Is it acceptable in this society for a
lawyer from Portland, Oregon to spend time in jail because of an error in
recording a fingerprint in Madrid, Spain (considering the attendant
prejudice and perhaps lifelong label)? Fingerprint technology is far more
easily controlled than that of computers, webs, and networks. Yet, at
least the government and much of corporate America is rushing
headlong into a surveillance society rife with errors and without
adequate safeguards of either electronics or law.
C. “One DOJ” Database
According to a December 26, 2006 article in the Washington Post, the
Department of Justice is building a massive database that allows state
and local police to search millions of files from the FBI, DEA, and other
federal law enforcement agencies.126 As of December 26, 2006, the
database is purported to hold over one million case records, and “is
projected to triple in size over the next three years.”127 There is no report
concerning this new database as to what, if any, procedures have been
utilized by the government to ensure that information contained within
it is correct, current, relevant, and without errors. The goal is to give all
federal, state, and local law enforcement access to all records of cases
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containing personal information about people, many of whom have not
been arrested or charged with any crime.
Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty, said, in a memo sent the
week before Christmas to the FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and other senior
Justice officials, that federal authorities will “accelerate . . . efforts to
share information from both open and closed cases.”128
The “garbage in, garbage out” proviso discussed previously is
especially relevant to this database as there are no controls on what an
individual agent puts into a criminal, or worse, potential criminal file.
Rumor, innuendo, and the lies of informants are part and parcel of the
entire criminal investigative process. That apparently will not stop this
progression of “OneDOJ,” unless Congress intervenes.
D. The Department of Justice: Investigation of Its Role in the NSA Program
In November 2006, the Inspector General for the Department of
Justice reported to the House Judiciary Committee that the office had
“decided to open a program review that will examine the Department’s
controls and use of information related to the program,” but the
investigation is not expected to address whether the controversial
program is an unconstitutional expansion of the power of the president,
as its critics and a federal judge in Detroit, Michigan have charged.129 A
Justice Department spokesman, Brian Roehrkasse, stated that the agency
welcomed the review, and that the Justice Department believes the
review “will assist Justice Department personnel in assuring that the
department’s activities comply with the legal requirements that govern
the operation of the program.”130
The Inspector General’s office, however, rejected the request by more
than three dozen Democrats to investigate the secret program, which
monitors phone calls and emails between people in the U.S. and abroad
when a link to terrorism is suspected.131 One of the goals of this
investigation could be a determination as to whether the spying program
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is in compliance with FISA, discussed previously.132 I would like to pose
a rhetorical question in that regard. Unless the NSA spying program
had a double secret (the author is reminded of the double secret
probation that Dean Wormer placed on the “Animal House” fraternity in
the movie of the same name) application for judicial authorization for
electronic surveillance, and/or searches, of those suspected of espionage
and international terrorism, then how can there be compliance with
FISA?
One observation that critics and questioning Democrats have made
was the timing of the announcement of the investigation. The request
for additional clearances was made on October 20, 2006, just prior to the
election, and were approved just after the elections.133 Of course,
Attorney General Gonzales had been pushing the former Republican-led
Congress to pass what amounts to an ex post facto legalization of the
program as discussed earlier concerning the Specter and/or the DeWine
bills. Those bills died in the 109th Congress as well they should.134
V. THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND A FREE SOCIETY—WHERE ARE
WE TODAY?
Again, a quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis is apropos to what is
confronted in the world we have inherited today. Justice Brandeis
predicted:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the government. . . .
Ways may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. . . . ”It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.”135
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A more prescient pronouncement would be hard to find.
At least two federal judges, one in Texas and one in New York, have
upheld traditional “probable cause” standards in denying the FBI the
ability to track the movements of cell phone users in the absence of a
showing that a crime had occurred or was in progress.136 The judges did,
however, approve other requests in those cases including the logging of
calls made and those received.137 A reasonable translation of that ruling
is that the FBI should investigate and not take short cuts, but when there
is in fact evidence of criminal misconduct, they will get what they want.
At least, in these two cases, we have come full circle with the recognition
that the Fourth Amendment is still the law of the land, and that, as it
persists, there is vitality to the concept of constitutional freedom in this
country.
There is also welcome evidence that the new, Democrat-led
Congress is forcing the legislative branch of our government to begin reasserting its role in ensuring that the executive branch operates within
the bounds of the law and the Constitution. The very first hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in the 110th Congress, for example,
considered and received testimony on the role of data mining and its
impact on privacy rights of American citizens.138 A week later, the
Attorney General was intensely questioned before the same panel of
Senators about secret surveillance, warrantless opening of mail, and
other invasions of privacy.139 If these early actions by the 110th Congress
are followed by two years of real oversight, and passage of protective
legislation like Senator Russ Feingold’s Senate Bill No. 236, a bill to
require reports to Congress on federal agency use of data mining,
Krim, supra note 49, at A5.
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introduced on January 10, 2007, there just might be some real
constitutional light at the end of the dark tunnel in which we have been
living since September 11.140
We must not, however, be content with minimalist efforts without
sustaining power. We must always remember that power, of any
government, once attained is never easily relinquished. This Article has
emphasized the electronic in its purview, but an old fashioned
communication system note provides a reaffirmation of this most
fundamental of principles of government power acquisition. On January
8, 2007, it was widely reported that, as President Bush signed a recent
postal reform bill, he added a signing statement that, though this law
allegedly enforced existing postal privacy, allowed the opening of mail
by federal agents for “exigent circumstances” without the interposition
of a warrant.141 Will Congress step in here too and force the president,
believing himself all-powerful, as a self-proclaimed “commander-inchief” to abide by the Constitution to which he swore an oath in 2001
and again in 2005? Of course, it is not just the current president. History
teaches us that each president considers the powers granted or taken by
his predecessors to constitute a floor, not a ceiling, for the powers he will
enjoy.
For its part, the Bush Administration announced January 17, 2007,
that it would suspend the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” which is the
name it gave to the program of warrantless eavesdropping on American
citizens in the United States without any court orders.142
The
Administration stated that it would henceforth run activities conducted
under that program through the FISC.143 This announcement reflects the
reality of a president no longer being able to count on a somnambulant
Congress to ratify or at least not conduct serious oversight of his
activities in this area, and the announcement is therefore a welcome step.
However, insofar as this Administration has in the past simply changed
the name of problematic programs and then continued them, the
Congress must conduct vigorous and continued oversight to understand,
in much greater degree than it has thus far, exactly what the
Administration has been doing in this regard. Once Congress has done
so, it must then take steps to ensure that the Administration actually
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stops the unlawful and unconstitutional practice of surveilling American
citizens without court orders.
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